In 1951, the United States informed the Dalai Lama that in order to obtain U.S. aid and support, he had to leave Tibet and “publicly reject the agreements reached under duress” between representatives of Tibet and China.  In 2012, the Dalai Lama mentioned that the seventeen point agreement was signed in the spirit of one country, two systems.   The signing of the seventeen point agreement was later challenged as invalid in the Tibetan community in exile, which accused Tibetan delegates of signing under duress and that the Chinese allegedly used fake Tibetan government seals. The exiled community and its supporters continue to claim that Tibetan representatives are not allowed to propose changes and that the Chinese government has not allowed Tibetan representatives to communicate with Lhasa.  In April 1951, the delegates arrived in Beijing with the full powers of the local government of Tibet. If China is serious about resolving the Tibetan issue, it must seriously reflect on the points it wanted to recognize in Tibet, but it never did: the Tibetan delegation initially contradicted the #1 reference to “aggressive imperialist forces of Tibet”, but later acknowledged that there might be such forces that they were unaware of. The points #2 and #3 were asked about the importance of “local government”, although the importance of “national regional autonomy” was not discussed, as the Tibetan delegation believed that things would continue as before. The delegation of Mr. Ngapois tried to withdraw the guarantees of power for the Panchen Lama on the points #5 and #6, but the Chinese delegation replied that the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama should be treated in the same way; either they have both guaranteed their power, or neither. The Tibetans recognized the point.
Fundamental differences on the point #8, the dissolution of the Tibetan army, led to the promise to renegotiate the subject later. The most controversial point was #15 concerning the establishment of a military and administrative committee, the Tibetan delegation believing that it opposed #11 on the local Tibetan government, the only one to undertake reforms. Most of the other points were accepted without comment or with minor translation adaptations. In order to avoid embarrassingly for the Chinese delegation, separate and secret agreements should be concluded a posteriori with the Tibetan delegation on issues such as the maintenance of the Tibetan army.  The 17-point agreement is a very important valid historical document that reveals the true nature of Sino-Tibetan relations at this decisive turning point in the history of Tibetan independence. . . .